within the states.
Despite the treaty power being entrusted solely to the federal government by the Constitution, its potentially unlimited scope made it a focus for concern over federal intrusion into matters traditionally entrusted to the states. Neither the Convention nor state ratifying conventions provided any guidance on how the national government was expected to enforce the nation's treaty obligations, primarily because treaties were envisioned to be self-executing. 18 The operation of the Supremacy Clause was seen as the primary mechanism to implement the treaty power, making treaties the supreme law of the land by binding "the Judges in every State . . . any Thing in the Constitution or Laws or any State to the Contrary notwithstanding." 19 Because of the assumption that treaties automatically became the supreme law of the land once ratified in accordance with constitutional process, the extent of Congress's ability to legislate to implement a treaty, particularly if outside of other federally enumerated powers, was not addressed at the Convention. As the doctrine of non-self-execution developed, 20 it provided proponents of a broad and a narrow treaty power another avenue to use the historical record to support their respective views. Nevertheless, no court has declared a congressional act implementing a treaty void because of its impact on states' rights. 21 Significant scholarship in the last ten years has not only analyzed the scope and history of the treaty clause as part of the drafting and adoption of the U.S. Constitution, but also the practice of the federal government in implementing this power. Representing opposing views of this recurring debate, Daniel Golove's views supporting a broad treaty power are opposed by scholars such as Curtis Bradley and Nicolas Rosenkratz, who seek to limit the domestic effect of the treaty power to those areas already within a federally enumerated power. 22 These dueling histories place the treaty power in its historical context, and interestingly are not new to the analysis of the treaty power. 23 Early in the 20th Century, similar evaluations of the history and judicial precedent outlined 18 The Treaty Power, supra note 12, at 250-51 ("Evidence that Founding-Era treaties were largely meant to self-execute includes the placement of treaties in the Supremacy Clause, an overt endorsement of self-execution at the North Carolina ratifying convention, and statements like Jefferson's in his Manual of Parliamentary Practice that " [t] reaties are legislative acts. A treaty is a law of the land."); A Civilized Nation, supra note 8, at 940, 994, 999-1000. 19 u.s. const., art. VI, cl. 2. 20 See Foster v. Nielson, 27 U.S. (2 Pet.) 253, 314 (1829) (Marshall, J.) ("A treaty is in its nature a contract between two nations, not a legislative act. It does not generally effect, of itself, the object to be accomplished, especially so far as its operation is infra-territorial; but is carried into execution by the sovereign power of the respective parties to the instrument. In the United States a different principle is established. Our constitution declares a treaty to be the law of the land. It is, consequently to be regarded in courts of justice as equivalent to an act of the legislature, whenever it operates of itself without the aid of any legislative provision . . . . But when the terms of the stipulation import a contract, when either of the parties engages to perform a particular act, the treaty addresses itself to the political, not the judicial department; and the legislature must execute the contract before it can become a rule for the Court."). hauntingly familiar arguments based on U.S. practice and historical analysis. 24 Although both Corwin and Butler, two leading scholars at the turn of the 20th Century, concluded that the Civil War had resolved the outstanding questions on the treaty power in favor of its broad scope unhindered by any reserved power of the states, 25 the Supreme Court had not explicitly determined if Congress's ability to legislate to implement treaties was limited to its otherwise enumerated powers. 26 In the view of many, this uncertainty was resolved by Missouri v. Holland. 27 The decision seemed to foreclose any federalism argument limiting Congressional implementation of a valid treaty. In that case the Supreme Court rejected a Tenth Amendment challenge to legislation implementing john+randolph+tucker#v=onepage&q=john%20randolph%20tucker&f=false; see corwin, National Supremacy, supra note 22 (arguing for broad treaty power, and creation of one sovereignty of all people of United States); see also John Randolph Tucker, 1 the constitution oF the united states: a critical discussion oF its genesis, develoPment, and interPretation, 294-301 (Henry St. George Tucker, ed.) (1899) (as basis of states' reserved rights, Tucker expounds on full sovereignty of founding states and arguing that the "people" referred to in the preamble were the people of the various sovereign states, not of one sovereignty of the United States), available at http://books.google.com/books?id=X sy0vyHmFM0C&pg=PA11&source=gbs_toc_r&cad=4#v=onepage&q&f=false [hereinafter Tucker, constitution]. 24 See Treaty-Making and the Nation, supra note 15, at 1265-66 (arguing that Holmes' central theory about the nature of the Tenth Amendment was based on his adoption of Corwin's thesis that the people of the United States formed a single sovereignty and as such the United States was fully sovereign within its enumerated powers. In rejecting the reserved powers implications of the states' rights advocates, premised upon Madison and Jefferson's Virginia and Kentucky Resolutions, he saw the Civil War as having resolved the central notion of one nation, which rejected the right of a state to secede); see also Butler, the treaty making Power, supra note 23, at § § 15-16, 142 (describing proponents of the States' rights view pre-bellum as John C. Calhoun and Chief Justice Taney and John Phillip Butler in the ante-bellum period, contrasted with broad constructionists Chief Justice Marshall and Justice Story pre-bellum, and Justices Field, Gray and Miller after the war); see also Tucker, constitution, supra note 23, at 294-301 (expounding on full sovereignty of founding states and arguing, as a basis of states' reserved rights, that the "people" referred to in the preamble were the people of the various sovereign states, not of one sovereignty of the United States). 25 See corwin, supra note 22, at 301-02 ("More rigorous exponents of this [state's rights] doctrine would confine the treaty-power to the field of powers which, exclusive of the treaty-power, are delegated to the United States, but the difficulties attaching to this view were admitted by Jefferson himself, who took if from Nicholas, and it has been hopelessly discredited by the history of negotiation, and adjudication thereon. But there are more far-reaching objects to the State-rights view of the treaty-power upon the score of history. Not only was this view sustained during the period of its greatest prominence by immediate concern for a great sectional interest which no long exists, but it rests upon a view of the fundamental character of the Constitution that is without historical warrant: the view, namely, that the Constitution was a compact among the State sovereignties; from which view was deduced quite logically, but to the utter defiance of the history of the matter, the proposition that the States in the exercise of their reserved powers are capable of confronting the National Government in the exercise of its delegated powers, when the two jurisdictions clash, as equal sovereigns."); Butler, the treaty making Power, supra note 23, at § 3 ("That the treaty-making power of the United States as vested in the Central Government, is derived not only from the powers expressly conferred by the Constitution, but that it is also possessed by that Government as an attribute of sovereignty, and that it extends to every subject which can be the basis for negotiation and contract between any of the sovereign powers of the world . . . [t] hat the power to legislate in regard to all matters affected by treaty stipulations and relations is co-extensive with the treaty-making power, and that acts of Congress enforcing such stipulations, which in the absence of treaty stipulations, would be unconstitutional as infringing on the powers reserved to the States, are constitutional, and can be enforced, even though they conflict with State laws or provisions of State constitutions.") 26 When faced with such a question in 1920, Justice Holmes relied extensively on Corwin's treatise, national suPremacy, to structure his opinion and inform his conclusions; Treaty-making and the Nation, supra note 15, at 1257-58. 27 Missouri v. Holland, 252 U.S. 416, 432 (1920) (tellingly, Congress itself sees Missouri v. Holland as dispositive of the issue of whether they have authority to legislate in support of a ratified treaty); see Senate on Treaties, supra note 5, at 66-67. the 1916 U.S./Canadian Migratory Bird Treaty. Absent the treaty, Congress had been held to lack authority to legislate to protect migratory birds. 28 In a concise opinion, Justice Holmes writing for the Court rejected the position that the Treaty and its implementing legislation were void as "an interference with the rights reserved to the states."
29 Echoing back to Madison's prescient description of the necessity of flexibility in the treaty power, Justice Holmes stated, "When we are dealing with words that also are a constituent act, like the Constitution of the United States, we must realize that they have called into life a being the development of which could not have been foreseen completely by the most gifted of its begetters." Evaluating the treaty power, the Court held, "It is obvious that there may be matters of the sharpest exigency for the national well being that an act of Congress could not deal with but that a treaty followed by such an act could." 30 Recognizing that qualifications to the treaty-making power "must be ascertained in a different way," 31 the Court determined first that the provision did not contravene any prohibitory language in the Constitution. Holland would once again be subject to national debate as states' rights advocates attempted to amend the Constitution to alter its conclusions. The context for this renewed debate was about as far removed from migratory birds as imaginable, and instead dealt with a core national security interest of the nation: U.S. involvement in the most important mutual defense relationship in our nation's history.
a. the nato status oF Forces agreement (soFa) treaty: Bricker strikes again.
The late 1940s and early 1950s required the United States to reevaluate its place and role in the world in the aftermath of World War II. In the immediate aftermath of World War II, the United States supported the creation of the United Nations as a replacement for the ineffective League of Nations. Participating in the negotiation of the 1949 Geneva Conventions during this critical period, the United States sought to incorporate the lessons drawn from its experience in the recent devastating total warfare of World War II and establish a world-wide standard of humanity in warfare. 35 The commencement of both the Cold War and the Korean War resulted in the creation 3-5 (1953) ("The primary function of the Federal Government in the conduct of our foreign relations has always been-but is much more consciously so today-that of providing a policy that will ensure national survival . . . . We have chosen a combination of national strength and active diplomacy, achieving a compromise between the theory-perhaps exploded by scientific assaults on time, space, and the atom-of an isolated continental fortress and of federal power at the expense of the states and the strengthening of the executive power at the federal level. Conservatives, concerned over these developments, "feared that these trends would be accelerated by America's increasingly active role in world affairs, especially its participation in the United Nations . . . . and sought to limit the domestic effects of the nation's growing international involvement." 40 Although differing from the traditional pre-World War II isolationists, conservatives in the early 1950s equated the expansion of federal executive power (often at the expense of the states) with increased involvement by the United States in world affairs. 41 This, and heightened concern over the potential impact of new human rights treaties on U.S. domestic law, seen as posing a danger to racial segregation and state sovereignty, 42 sparked renewed opposition in Congress over the scope of the Treaty power. Leading the effort to restrict treaty powers was Senator John Bricker, who in 1951 embarked on a battle to overturn Missouri v. Holland 43 and limit the Treaty power through constitutional amendment.
44 Senator Bricker's various attempts to amend the U.S. Constitution included prohibitions on the domestic operation of any U.S. treaty absent specific enabling legislation passed by Congress making its provisions operative domestically, and limits on the subject-matter of such legislation to that already authorized Congress in Article I. 45 In the early 1950s, both parties in Congress "fundamentally viewed the world situation in the same way," with President Eisenhower "inherit[ing] his basic national security structure from the Democratic Truman, and adopt[ing]the broad outlines of his policies."
46 During this critical juncture in our nation's struggle against an increasingly dangerous Soviet threat, the United States was engaged in the Korean War, had over 3.6 million men in uniform, was allocating billions of dollars to defense, and was involved in a policy of "active diplomacy . . . to coordinate the military the theory of some supranational polity. This compromise has appeared in an age of global military problems in which the free nations of the world must jointly meet the threat of a monolithic totalitarian dictatorship ruling one-third of the peoples and natural resources of the world . . . the policy of the past decade has been that of an active diplomacy backed by military preparedness. This course has required active Congressional support."); see also duane tananBaum, the Bricker amendment controversy, a test oF eisenhower's Political leadershiP 103-07 (Cornell Univ. Press, 1988 The tests and focus of these various proposed amendments changed, at times focusing on substantially limiting the federal treaty power, and at others, on paring it or requiring implementing legislation by Congress in order to make it the law of the land. See generally tananBaum, supra note 39 (providing an excellent discussion of the Bricker Amendment controversy). At its most basic, these efforts to amend the Constitution included the fundamental provision of the various proposed amendments that: "A treaty shall become effective as internal law in the United States only through legislation which would be valid in the absence of treaty." See also henkin, supra note 5, at 192. "An expression of isolationism of a very powerful kind," 48 Bricker's attempt to amend the Constitution reflected discomfort with the increasing number of treaties and executive agreements entered into by the United States to meet the threat of Soviet power and ensure U.S. national security interests after World War II, 49 and the related desire to limit their domestic effect. Although ultimately defeated in 1954, Senator Bricker's proposed Constitutional amendment caused significant concern in the Truman and Eisenhower Administrations because the proposed alteration of the treaty power would seriously disrupt the exercise of U.S. foreign policy. 50 Conducted simultaneously with its deliberation over the Bricker Amendment, the Senate considered the NATO SOFA Treaty. The debate over this treaty, and the reservation proposed by Senator Bricker, intended to alter one of the treaty's fundamental articles detailing criminal jurisdiction, reflected the underlying domestic political dispute over U.S. foreign policy and the role of treaties in U.S. law generally present in the early 1950s.
During the Senate's 1953 deliberations on the treaty, Senator Bricker seized on the treaty's allocation of criminal jurisdiction over visiting military forces as the focal point of his sovereigntyand federalism-based opposition. In an effort to nullify the concurrent jurisdictional arrangement of the treaty -whereby 'receiving' nations shared concurrent criminal jurisdiction over foreign military forces stationed in their national territory -Bricker offered a reservation to retain sole criminal jurisdiction over U.S. military personnel overseas in exchange for granting the same status to foreign soldiers in the United States. His opposition to the criminal jurisdiction provisions of the NATO SOFA, discussed in greater detail below, 51 reflected both a narrow understanding of jurisdiction over military forces generally, and a resistance to the increasing role of the United States as a global power with binding international commitments.
52 The Senate's ultimate rejection of Senator Bricker's reservation and its discussion and comprehension of the effect of these provisions on domestic U.S. law, reflect its perception of the ultimate benefit gained from the integrated NATO 52 Senator Bricker's view that the law of the flag governed criminal jurisdiction over troops present in foreign nations, resulted in his conclusion that the NATO SOFA impermissibly expanded foreign jurisdiction over U.S. servicemen. His proposed reservation offered to preserve law of the flag jurisdiction for U.S. servicemembers (a view not accepted universally in international law), but also for foreign NATO servicemembers present on United States soil. His amendment would have completely removed criminal jurisdiction from U.S. states, an ironic outcome when considered against his attempts to amend the U.S. Constitution to limit the domestic effect of treaties. Prior to the twentieth century there were few instances of the peacetime presence of military forces within a foreign country outside the context of belligerent occupation or allied wartime cooperation. 53 While it was generally understood that a friendly military force conducting consensual transit through the territory of another sovereign retained jurisdiction over its transiting soldiers, 54 this limited understanding did not create a norm of customary international law regarding the allocation of jurisdiction more generally, and in particular for the longer term consensual basing of forces in another state. Instead, two competing views existed on the issue of criminal jurisdiction over visiting military forces; yet neither emerged as the prevailing view prior to the advent of World War I. The most 'force-protective' theory was a view advanced by early American scholars, that of the "Law of the Flag." According to this view, the sending state's law 55 applied exclusively to its military forces at all times absent an international agreement to the contrary, providing visiting friendly military forces absolute immunity from a receiving state's criminal jurisdiction. In contrast, British and other commentators focused on the territorial jurisdiction of the receiving state, recognizing at best concurrent jurisdiction between the territorial receiving state and the sending state's disciplinary authority over its own armed forces. 56 Because of the uncertainty of international law governing visiting friendly military forces, nations entered into specific international agreements to delineate criminal jurisdiction over their forces during World War I, and again in World War II.
57
The specific arrangements adopted by these wartime agreements usually reflected the need and bargaining positions of the nations involved. For example, France granted exclusive criminal jurisdiction to visiting Allied armed forces in World War I, a manifestation of France's urgent need for allied intervention and recognition that her Allies were in effective control of their respective (1812)). 55 When discussing SOFAs, the terminology, "sending state" and "receiving state" are important, delineating the nation whose troops are sent to the foreign nation, and the foreign nation receiving those troops. These terms are used in the NATO SOFA because its reciprocal nature results in a nation being both a sending and receiving state depending on the specifics of the locations of the nation's military forces in the territory of other nations. 56 See Senate NATO SOFA Supp. Hearing, supra note 54, at 47-51 (discussing the two countervailing international views and practice on these two theories, and United States historical cases rejecting the asserted theory of absolute immunity); Superveille, supra note 38; see also Murray L. Schwartz, International Law and the NATO SOFA Agreement, 53 colum. l. rev. 1091, 1094-99 (1953) . 57 See Schwartz, supra note 56, at 1094-99. areas of responsibility. 58 In contrast, only the United States successfully negotiated exclusive jurisdiction with Britain over U.S. forces present in the United Kingdom during World War II. 59 As to other Allies, Britain authorized the exercise of jurisdiction by friendly forces only for discipline and internal administration, and it retained exclusive British jurisdiction over murder, manslaughter, and rape-offenses that could be tried solely by British civil courts. In an ostensible move to reciprocate the British grant of exclusive jurisdiction to visiting American forces in World War II, Congress enacted the U.S. Service Courts of Friendly Foreign Forces Act of 1944. However, Congress rejected a proposed provision in this statute divesting U.S. courts of jurisdiction over visiting British forces, instead acting to "implement whatever jurisdiction the foreign service courts brought with them to this country."
60 Thus the passage of this statute was at best a recognition of concurrent jurisdiction.
61
In 1948, Belgium, France, Luxembourg, the Netherlands, and Great Britain established a multilateral defense alliance in response to the perceived Soviet bloc threat after World War II. This Brussels Treaty "contemplated the stationing of allied troops in each other's countries for an indefinite period of time," and therefore, it included a SOFA which explicitly recognized not only the existence of the receiving state's jurisdiction but which also allocated criminal jurisdiction between the sending and receiving states based on the degree of harm caused by the offense to each State. 62 Although never coming into effect, this arrangement became the basis of the NATO SOFA's criminal jurisdiction allocation provisions. In 1952, Britain passed the Visiting Forces Act. This Act paralleled the provisions of the NATO SOFA, and "vitiate[ed] the 1942 grant of exclusive jurisdiction" to the United States.
the nato soFa
It was against this backdrop that the United States Senate considered the NATO SOFA Treaty, which provided for shared jurisdiction between sending and receiving states. The international law territoriality principle of jurisdiction recognizes the legitimate authority of nations to assert criminal jurisdiction of all persons found within their borders, an incident of sovereignty exercised by all nations today, including the United States. 64 However, all states may also consent to limit this 58 Id. at 1095. 59 Id. at 1096 (explaining that nevertheless, the 1942 U.K. Act granting exclusive jurisdiction to the U.S. over its forces was seen as "a "very considerable departure ... from the traditional system and practice of the United Kingdom"). In 1953, however, not all members of the U.S. Senate-most notably, Senator John W. Brickerwere willing to acknowledge the applicability of territorial jurisdiction over visiting forces. Based largely on Justice Marshall's dicta in The Schooner Exchange case, 66 there was substantial scholarship at the time supporting the view that exclusive criminal jurisdiction over friendly visiting military forces lay solely in the sending state under the Law of the Flag doctrine.
67 Therefore, because he contended that the foundational premise upon which the NATO SOFA was based was fundamentally flawed,
68
Senator Bricker proposed a reservation to the Resolution of Ratification "giving American military authorities exclusive jurisdiction over American forces committing crimes in Europe and giving NATO allies the same authority over their troops in the United States." 69 Senator Bricker's willingness to waive U.S. territorial jurisdiction appeared to rest on at least two (mistaken) assumptions: first, that the SOFA would only apply to military forces entering the United States as an organized unit, not as individuals; and second, that the absolute number of foreign military members in that status in the United States would be small. 70 For Bricker, the law of the flag was a core norm of both international and U.S. law, and he therefore considered the shared jurisdiction framework of the NATO SOFA to be an impermissible expansion of the jurisdiction of receiving states over visiting U.S. forces.
71 Senator Bricker's reservation to the NATO SOFA By giving advice and consent for ratification of the NATO SOFA without Bricker's proposed reservation, the Senate ultimately rejected his narrow view of criminal jurisdiction, but also affirmed the American commitment to leading the defense of the free world. Although the Senate Foreign Relations Committee was concerned about the exercise of criminal jurisdiction over 'our boys' by foreign nations due to fundamental differences in legal systems and basic rights, 77 its advice and systems, focusing on the lack of rights to appeal right to a jury trial, rights to a public trial and to be tried publically before a jury, as well as the lack of bail provisions and a provision preventing cruel and unusual punishment. 1) [T]he criminal jurisdiction provisions contained in Article VII of the agreement do not constitute a precedent for future agreements; (2) when a service member is to be tried by authorities in a receiving state, the commanding officer of the U.S. armed force in that state shall review the laws of the receiving state with regard to the procedural safeguards of the U.S. Constitution; (3) if the commanding officer believes there is danger that the servicemember will not be protected because of the absence or denial of constitutional rights the accused would receive in the United States, the commanding officer shall request that the receiving state waive its jurisdiction; and (4) a representative of the United States be appointed to attend the trial of any servicemember being tried by the receiving state and act to protect the constitutional rights of the servicemember."). 74 Id. 75 See Eisenhower Letter to Knowland, supra note 69; see also tananBaum, supra note 39, at 106. 76 tananBaum, supra note 39, at 106. 77 The Senate focused on the list of procedural rights accorded by Article VII(9) of the NATO SOFA, and the absence of other rights familiar to Americans, specifically, the lack of a guarantee to a jury trial, the presumption of innocence, a public trial, and to a ban on cruel and unusual punishment. Recognizing that this SOFA would inevitably serve as a baseline for future SOFA agreements, with agreements with Japan under consideration at the time of ratification, the Senate understood the importance of the due process rights enunciated by the Treaty, and those not consent to ratification indicated acceptance of the trade-off inherent in the reciprocal nature of NATO SOFA criminal jurisdiction provisions and the balance it reflected between the needs of the sending and receiving States in the integrated defense effort supporting U.S. foreign policy. The State Department, and ultimately the required two-thirds of the Senate, 78 concluded that the NATO SOFA provided more protection to U.S. soldiers overseas, albeit at the cost of jurisdictional concessions within the United States. 79 The Senate understood both the necessity of a continued U.S. military presence in Europe to counter the growing Soviet threat, and the concomitant necessity of treaty arrangements to deal with long-term peacetime stationing of large numbers of soldiers in other countries. The Senate's approval also marked a significant foreign policy victory for the Eisenhower Administration, and had "important implications for the fight over the Bricker Amendment," 80 with thirteen Senators who had previously supported Bricker's constitutional amendment, voting for ratification of the NATO SOFA.
81
Significantly, the debate over the NATO SOFA "illustrated some of the debilitating effects the Bricker Amendment would have, such as preventing the United States from entering into the Status of Forces Agreement." 82 Rejecting claims by proponents of the Bricker Amendment that the NATO SOFA "provided further proof that a constitutional amendment was needed to protect the rights of the American people," 83 the votes by the thirteen Senators who had supported Bricker's constitutional amendment were essential to its approval.
The Senate, accepting both the NATO Treaty itself and the NATO SOFA, understood both the necessity of mutual defense arrangements and the concomitant restriction on U.S. unilateral action.
84
Ratification indicates that both the President and the Senate accepted the necessity of binding international ties in the U.S. policy of "active diplomacy," even when those agreements affected both the rights of U.S. soldiers overseas, and the jurisdiction of domestic U.S. courts. Such a consensus in the midst of the ongoing controversy over Senator Bricker's multi-year attempt to amend the Constitution and reverse the conclusions of Missouri v. Holland, had broader significance: an endorsement and recognition of the importance of federal control of the treaty power, even in the face of significant effects on what were traditional areas of state control, such as criminal justice. It similarly reflected rejection of the view of inherent subject matter limitations on the treaty power as Bricker's various defeated constitutional amendment proposals included purported attempts to limit legislation in support of treaties to those areas already within federal enumerated powers.
Since that time, treaties have become an even more significant mechanism for the regulation of armed conflict, and therefore even more vital to the national security interests of the United States. The Senate provided advice and consent to ratify the CWC in 1997 after extensive negotiations and discussions with the White House. Apart from significant political brokering between the two political branches to accomplish this end, the Senate held extensive hearings on the constitutional issues it perceived as potentially problematic in the CWC and its proposed Implementation Act. Foremost among them were Fourth and Fifth Amendment concerns related to the verification regime proposed under the Convention. However, there was no indication of any concern related to the constitutionality of legislation to implement the ratified Convention, particularly as the terms of the Convention had been drafted to be consistent with the requirements of search and seizure law and the constraints imposed by the U.S. Constitution.
87
Accordingly, following the 1997 ratification of the CWC, Congress passed the Chemical Weapons Convention Implementation Act of 1998 along with its associated penal provisions.
88
These penal provisions included 18 U.S.C. § 229, which implemented the U.S. obligation to 85 Closely tracking the language of the CWC, the relevant portions of the statute under which Bond was charged prohibit:
89
When Carol-Anne Bond discovered that her best friend Myrlinda Haynes had been impregnated by Carol-Anne's husband, she began a campaign of harassment against her former friend. Focused on revenge, Bond obtained two potent toxic chemicals, 10-chloro10H-phenoxarsine and potassium dichromate, either of which can prove deadly at doses of less than one-half a teaspoon, and which can cause toxic harm to humans after minimal topical contact. On at least twenty-four separate occasions Bond spread these chemicals on her friend's mailbox, car door handles, and home doorknob. Although Ms. Haynes normally noticed the chemicals and avoided them, on at least one occasion, she "sustained a chemical burn to her thumb." After the local police proved less than responsive, Ms. Haynes complained to her local post office. Postal inspectors investigated and ultimately arrested Bond. She was charged in federal district court with two counts of possessing and using a chemical weapon in violation of 18 U.S.C. § 229(a)(1), and two counts of mail theft.
90
Among other motions, Bond moved to dismiss the chemical weapons charges claiming that § 229 was unconstitutional because "it violates principles of federalism embodied in our Constitution."
91
The district court denied her motions ruling that § 229 did not violate the principles of federalism because it was properly enacted by Congress and signed by the President under the necessary and proper clause of the Constitution to comply with the terms of a treaty. 92 Subsequently, Bond 89 See 18 U.S.C. § 229(a); see § 229F(1)(A) (defining "chemical weapon" as a "toxic chemical and its precursors, except where intended for a purpose not prohibited under this chapter as long as the type and quantity is consistent with such a purpose"); § 299F(8)(A) (defining "toxic chemical" as "any chemical which through its chemical action on life processes can cause death, temporary incapacitation or permanent harm to humans or animals"); § 299F(7)(A) (noting that permitted purposes include "any peaceful purpose related to an industrial, agricultural, research, medical, or pharmaceutical activity or other activity" 
93
The facts of Ms. Bond's case 94 certainly exemplify the concern over the federal criminalization of conduct which would otherwise have been considered local and left to the ministration of the State of Pennsylvania. On appeal, Bond argued that § 229 was unconstitutional because it permitted a massive expansion of federal law enforcement into areas traditionally reserved to the states "without regard to the federalism boundaries enshrined in the Constitution, [and] violates "the unique system of federalism protected by the Tenth Amendment." She argued that permitting federal prosecution of "localized offenses" was a "massive and Thus, after the Supreme Court's first Bond decision, persons injured by the application of treaty provisions or treaty-implementing legislation would have standing "to challenge a law as enacted in 93 See id. at 132-33 (noting that Bond also appealed the denial of her motion to suppress evidence of the chemicals found pursuant to a search warrant of her home and car, contending that there was no probable cause to support the issuance of the search warrant, and additionally appealed a sentencing enhancement for use of a special skill in the commission of a crime). The Framers concluded that allocation of powers between the National Government and the States enhances freedom, first by protecting the integrity of the governments themselves, and second by protecting the people, from whom all governmental powers are derived. contravention of constitutional principles of federalism." 99 Recognizing that Bond had standing to contest her conviction on the basis that the statute upon which it was based violated the principles of federalism embodied in the Tenth Amendment, the Court reversed and remanded the case to the Third Circuit to determine if the statute was a valid exercise of Congressional power, because it can be "deemed 'necessary and proper for carrying into Execution' the President's Article II, § 2 Treaty Power." 100 Unsurprisingly, the Third Circuit returned to Missouri v. Holland, as its touchstone to resolve the Tenth Amendment challenge. 101 At its core, the Court stated, Missouri v. Holland teaches that, "when there is a valid treaty, Congress has authority to enact implementing legislation under the Necessary and Proper Clause, even if it might otherwise lack the ability to legislate in the domain in question."
102 In order to qualify as necessary and proper, the legislation and the treaty must be rationally related to each other.
103
In evaluating the validity of the criminal statute challenged by Bond, the court utilized a threepart analysis, providing a useful template for future cases involving federalism challenges to treatyimplementing legislation. First, despite Bond's concession that the CWC was a proper subject for international negotiations, the court evaluated whether the CWC "falls within the Treaty power's appropriate scope."
104 On this question, the court concluded it did. Next, the court evaluated whether the implementing legislation was within the Necessary and Proper Clause as sufficiently related to the CWC. 105 It was. Finally, and intertwined with the first two considerations, the court evaluated whether the provision in some way violated the balance between the federal and state powers embodied in the Tenth Amendment. 106 However, even after applying this three-part assessment, the Third Circuit expressed frustration at the lack of guidance provided by Holland on these three inextricably related considerations, particularly in light of global changes since 1920. The court posited that the Holland Court may have provided more guidance on the impact of federalism to "assess the validity of a treaty, and hence of coextensive treaty-implementing legislation," 107 had it been faced with a less clear exercise of the Treaty power.
108
Evaluation of the treaty power's proper subject matter led the court to examine the drafting history and contemporaneous discussion of the Constitution's treaty provisions. As the Third Circuit concluded, these provisions indicated almost conclusively that the founders viewed the purpose of treaties as limited to the regulation of intercourse with foreign nations, and that they expected the exercise of the treaty power was expected to be consistent with those external ends. 109 At its core, the treaty power encompassed war, peace, negotiation and foreign commerce. Additionally, treaties that encroached on matters that ordinarily were left to the states were historically within the treaty power's ambit: "so long as the [international] subject matter limitation was satisfied . . . it was accepted that treaties could affect domestic issues."
110
The Third Circuit evaluated cases and scholarship that contrasted the post-Holland view that the Treaty Power was unlimited-that anything two nations chose to negotiate about was by definition international in character 111 -with recent scholarship suggesting that the Treaty Power was, as originally contemplated by the Framers, more limited, requiring some minimal international subject matter.
112
The Third Circuit expressed frustration with the absence of further clarification by the Supreme Court after the Holland decision. The court recognized that such additional guidance might help to evaluate modern multi-lateral treaties, which deal with matters beyond the traditional sphere of the treaty power the framers would have recognized, or to explain the Tenth Amendment's impact as the treaty power expanded beyond those traditional limits and encroached further into areas of traditional state sovereignty. 113 Nevertheless, the Third Circuit concluded that the CWC was at the core of the treaty power, addressing "war, peace, and perhaps commerce."
114 Thus, even if that power were to be defined restrictively, the CWC fell within its legitimate scope.
Because of its conclusion (and Bond's concession) that the CWC fell within the scope of the historically and traditionally recognized treaty power, the court concluded that its implementing legislation was valid unless it "somehow goes beyond the Convention."
115 Bond contended that the Act covered a wide range of activity not banned by the Convention, and therefore violated this limitation.
116
Having already evaluated this claim in its first review of Bond's case, the Third Circuit restated that "Section 229 . . . closely adheres to the language of the . . . Convention," 117 identical language between the treaty and the statute is not required. 118 Applying the test under the Necessary and Proper Clause to determine, "whether the statute constitutes a means that is rationally related to the implementation of a constitutionally enumerated power," 119 the Third Circuit concluded the CWC was "implemented by sufficiently related legislation."
120
Finally, the court evaluated Bond's claim that federalism, as well as affirmative restrictions on government power like the First Amendment, imposed limits on the Treaty power.
121 Applying the clear unequivocal language of Holland, "that there can be no dispute about the validity of a statute implementing a valid treaty," the Third Circuit rejected Bond's Tenth Amendment claim.
122
Evaluating Holland, the court recognized that it had been decided at a time when an implied subject matter limitation on the Treaty power existed --specifically, that the Treaty power must have some minimal international focus and was designed to be consistent with the division of powers between the federal and state governments. Thus, the Third Circuit determined that the Supreme Court's conclusion that the Tenth Amendment "only reserves those powers that are not delegated and that the power to make treaties is delegated" was entirely sensible in Holland, because it involved a treaty of recognizably national interest and co-extensive legislation.
123
Though it acknowledged the significance of the Supreme Court's emphasis on the important role that federalism plays in preserving individual rights, the Third Circuit nevertheless felt itself bound by the clear holding of Holland. However, the court also highlighted two intertwined ways in which additional Supreme Court guidance could elucidate the meaning of Holland in future cases implicating the Treaty Power. First, the Third Circuit recognized, as a proper subject for judicial resolution, the question of whether a negotiated Treaty falling outside the "traditionally understood bounds of the Treaty Power" had reached a constitutional boundary. 124 For the Third Circuit, Holland provided no guidance for a court to apply in resolving such a question. The court was reduced to concluding that, "The deliberately vague boundaries of the Treaty Power would probably relegate that court to the unenviable position of saying it knew a violation when it saw one." 125 Second, referring back to the "evolving" view of the Treaty Power in which anything negotiated between sovereigns was within the proper subject matter of the Treaty power, the Third Circuit queried: Before the outer limits of the treaty power are reached, however, it may be that federalism does have some effect on a treaty's constitutionality. While it is not our prerogative to ignore Holland 's rejection of federalism limitations upon the Treaty Power, the Supreme Court could clarify whether principles of federalism have 126 Addressing this question would also provide lower courts vital insight into the limits of implementing legislation.
In Holland, Justice Holmes reaffirmed the nationalist view of the Treaty power, seeing it as an independent power delegated to the federal government, rather than a means to exercise powers otherwise delegated in Article I. 127 For Holmes, because the treaty power was an exclusively delegated Constitutional power given solely to the federal government, its exercise was necessarily supreme over contrary State law. Additionally for Holmes, a Civil War veteran, the contention that States had reserved specified matters from the Treaty power had been largely resolved by the Civil War. 128 Rather than referring to the states' rights theory of the Tenth Amendment which had been discredited by the outcome of the Civil War, 129 Holmes' 'invisible radiation' language instead refers to more basic structural limitation on federal power vis-à-vis the States. As explained by Prof. David Golove: hen we are dealing with words that also are a constituent act, like the Constitution of the United States, we must realize that they have called into life a being the development of which could not have been foreseen completely by the most gifted of its begetters. It was enough for them to realize or to hope that they had created an organism; it has taken a century and has cost their successors much sweat and blood to prove that they created a nation. The case before us must be considered in the light of our whole experience and not merely in that of what was said a hundred years ago . . . . The only question is whether [the treaty] is forbidden by some invisible radiation from the general terms of the Tenth Amendment. We must consider what this country has become in deciding what that Amendment has reserved."). 129 See Treaty-Making and the Nation, supra note 15, at 1087-88 (stating that under the states' rights theory, the Treaty Power was not a separate power delegated to the federal government, but instead merely one avenue to exercise the other powers delegated to the federal government).
any role in assessing an exercise of the Treaty Power that goes beyond the traditionally understood subject matter for treaties." Holland itself indicates that "invisible radiation[s] from the general terms of the Tenth Amendment" may be pertinent in deciding whether there is any space between obviously valid treaties and obviously ultra vires treaties and whether, in that space, some judicial review of treaties and their implementing legislation may be undertaken to preserve the federal structure of our government. The "invisible radiation[s]" imagery is unusual but, in light of current conceptions about the breadth of the Treaty Power, it may well be worth taking seriously.
[I]n combination with other provisions and general structural considerations, . . . the Tenth Amendment provides the states with certain special immunities from federal regulation--such as the prohibition on Congress to "commandeer" state legislative or executive processes or subject states to suit in federal or state court. These more nebulous "Tenth Amendment" dignitary limitations arise from, or are 130 As Holmes states in Holland, "We do not mean to imply that there are no qualifications to the treaty-making power; but they must be ascertained in a different way."
131 Thus, to determine whether the "invisible radiations" of the Tenth Amendment prohibit any particular exercise of the Treaty power, one must determine if its implementation transgresses either an express prohibition of the Constitution, 132 or otherwise violates "state sovereign immunity or dignitary interests."
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For the Third Circuit, Holland's categorical rejection of federalism limits on the Treaty power left unanswered the question of whether the Tenth Amendment could limit the way in which a valid treaty was implemented, perhaps, by incorporating federalism limits into judicial evaluation of an implementing legislation's nexus to the treaty, or judicial interpretation of the permissible effects of the domestic operation of self-executing treaties. For example, a self-executing treaty or implementing congressional legislation could not commandeer state governmental processes. While both Congress and the Courts take explicit Constitutional limits into account in implementing or interpreting treaties, it is unclear, after Holland, whether more nebulous federalism concerns impose additional constraints that should be addressed through judicial interpretation. Shared criminal jurisdiction is not unique to the CWC, the federal government routinely prosecutes as civil rights violations, offenses which would otherwise fall under the criminal jurisdiction of the states. 134 As Holland made clear, "If the treaty is valid there can be no dispute about the validity of the statute under Article 1, Section 8, as a necessary and proper means to execute the treaty powers of the Government."
135
The Third Circuit, however, did not have the final say in Bond's case. Following the Third Circuit's decision upholding her conviction, the Supreme Court again granted certiorari to determine the merits of Ms. Bond's federalism challenge to the statute. Many anticipated that the Court would use the case to finally address the substance of Justice Holmes' "invisible radiations" from the Tenth Amendment, or to provide guidance on any subject matter limitations to the Treaty Power, or address the scope of Congress's ability to legislate to implement a treaty. No such outcome materialized. Instead the Court reversed Bond's convictions, not on a constitutional basis, but instead on a statutory grounds--its analysis of § 229 of the CWC Implementation Act.
136
Exercising the constitutional avoidance doctrine, the Court split the implementing legislation from its authorizing Treaty. As the Court explained: "[W]e have no need to interpret the scope of the Convention in this case. Bond was prosecuted under section 229-and the statute, unlike the Convention-must be read consistent with the principles of federalism inherent in our constitutional structure."
137
Analyzing the statute, the Court discovered an ambiguity in § 229 that arose from its context, an ambiguity created by the broad reach of § 229's definition of a "chemical weapon." This ambiguity arose solely because of § 229's potential broad impact on the traditional allocation of law enforcement authority between the Federal government and the States. This ambiguity led the Court to adopt a "clear indication" rule, requiring Congress to clearly indicate its intent to drastically alter the traditional balance between State and Federal prerogatives when legislating to implement a treaty. Absent such a clear indication, purely local crimes were not reachable, at least in "this curious case" 138 where there was no need for such drastic alterations with a Treaty that was instead focused on chemical warfare and terrorism. Thus, because Congress had not clearly stated its intent to reach these "purely local crimes" in the CWC Implementation Act, the statute's criminal proscription did not reach Ms. Bond's purely local assault. 139 Id. at 2089-90 (Scalia J. concurring) (Justices Scalia, Thomas, and Alito disagreed that there was any ambiguity in the statute, concluding that the language of § 229 was clear, and unambiguously reached Ms. Bond's local conduct. All three justices, therefore, wrote of their views of the Treaty power, with Justice Scalia adopting the most restrictive view. For Justice Scalia, Congress only had power under the Necessary and Proper clause to act to assist the President in "making" the Treaty. Accordingly, Congress had to rely on a separate Article I power in order to legislate to implement a treaty. In effect, Justice Scalia was advocating a constitutional view that had been defeated in the Bricker amendment controversies of the 1950s) and one which is advocated by Nicholas Rosenkrantz in Executing The Treaty Power, supra note 15.
purpose of the treaty it implemented. 140 This approach seemed to be inconsistent with the drafting history of the implementing legislation. When Congress drafted the statute and created federal crimes for its violation, it never considered a Tenth Amendment restriction on that jurisdiction, instead focusing on other constitutional concerns such as the Fourth Amendment restrictions on searches.
Given the Senate's understanding at the time it adopted the CWC and its implementing legislation that, "it seems well settled since Missouri v. Holland that the powers reserved to the States under the Tenth Amendment constitute no bar to the exercise of the treaty power," 141 this is unsurprising, and logically explains why the CWC Implementation Act contained no clear statement on the impact of the legislation on state powers. While the rule adopted by the Bond Court prospectively may enable Congress to signal when it really means to fully exercise its treaty implementing power, it leaves legislation implementing past treaties subject to this new federalism impediment. In fact, on the basis of Bond, district courts are now engaged in evaluating federalismbased attacks on other statutes affecting state's traditional areas, with defendants claiming that Bond requires, as a general principle, a clear statement of Congress's intent to disturb traditional federalstate relations, even when Congress was not legislating to implement the treaty power. 142 Further, in requiring Congress to make such a clear statement in treaty-implementing legislation, the Court did not discuss how such a remedy would apply when a self-executing treaty affected the traditional balance between the Federal and State powers. While it did imply that a different 140 Id. at 2090-91 ("These precedents make clear that it is appropriate to refer to basic principles of federalism embodied in the Constitution to resolve ambiguity in a federal statute. In this case, the ambiguity derives from the improbably broad reach of the key statutory definition given the term-"chemical weapon"-being defined; the deeply serious consequences of adopting such a boundless reading; and the lack of any apparent need to do so in light of the context from which the statute arose-a treaty about chemical warfare and terrorism. We conclude that, in this curious case, we can insist on a clear indication that Congress meant to reach purely local crimes, before interpreting the statute's expansive language in a way that intrudes on the police power of the States . . . it is fully appropriate to apply the background assumption that Congress normally preserves 'the constitutional balance between the National Government and the States.' That assumption is grounded in the very structure of the Constitution. rule might apply, 143 the Court did not address self-executing treaties at all. This concern is far from illusory. A much more direct and potentially disruptive effect on the balance between federal and state authorities in our constitutional structure is produced by a different category of treaty related to military affairs, the history of which was discussed above: status of forces agreements (SOFAs).
B. visiting Forces, status agreements, and the usurPation oF state criminal Jurisdiction?
The Bond case raises potentially significant federalism concerns in relation to treaties regulating the means of warfare. However, a much more direct and potentially disruptive effect on the balance between federal and state authorities in our Constitutional structure is produced by a different category of treaty related to military affairs: status of forces agreements (SOFAs). Because the numbers of foreign soldiers present in the United States are relatively few in comparison to the numbers of U.S. soldiers overseas, the effect of these agreements on the federal-state division of power has been infrequent Nonetheless, SOFAs offer an important illustration of the intersection of treaty power and federalism concerns, and how Bond's clear statement rule could genuinely frustrate the nation's ability to advance its national security interests by reciprocally protecting allied forces from assertions of a state's criminal power.
The United States hosts over 7000 military students from over 136 nations at 150 schools or installations nationwide under its International Military Education and Training (IMET) program. most SOFAs take the form of executive agreements, some of which are concluded on the basis of authority contained in a treaty, while others are based on other congressional authority, and still others, more loosely associated with other defense agreements or based on exclusive executive authority. 149 Because the domestic legal effect of the alternatives to formal Article II, section 2 treaties is far from settled, the form of the SOFA can be critical is assessing its federalism impact. Although treaties clearly operate as the supreme law of the land under the Constitution's Supremacy Clause, the effect of a SOFA concluded by executive agreement would not necessarily have the same domestic force and effect. Accordingly, any interference with a state criminal prosecution arising from operation of a SOFA, particularly the typical executive agreement type SOFA, could very easily trigger federalism concerns and state initiated challenge to the effect of the agreement. Because the NATO SOFA jurisdictional framework is considered a benchmark and model for all other SOFA type agreements, examination of its criminal jurisdiction provisions is critical to understanding the potential impact of SOFAs on federalism. and is therefore fully subject to state laws with some restrictions on state laws that may interfere with performance of the federal function. Under the Assimilative Crimes Act, 18 U.S.C. section 3, acts or omissions that would constitute crimes under the state law in which the installation is located will constitute similar federal crimes if the act occurs in an area under federal jurisdiction (either concurrent or exclusive). See u.s. deP't oF army Field manual 19-10, military Police law and order oPerations, 47-49 (1987); see also Senate NATO SOFA Hearing, supra note 71, at 31 (explaining that because many federal military installations have been formed over the years, it is possible that some portions of an installation may be subject to concurrent state jurisdiction and some to exclusive federal jurisdiction. So the location of the offense will determine whether the federal government alone or the state and federal government will have jurisdiction over the offense. Some installations can be subject to federal jurisdiction and the concurrent jurisdiction of more than one state. For example, Fort Campbell straddles the boundary between Tennessee and Kentucky, and is a concurrent jurisdiction installation subject to the laws of either Kentucky or Tennessee depending on where on the installation a criminal act occurs. Other installations formed over a lengthy period of time will have some areas of exclusive federal jurisdiction and others of concurrent jurisdiction). 155 Use of German forces as examples is solely because their presence in the U.S. is long-standing. It involves the stationing of German units in the U.S. and does not imply any proclivity or tendency by the German forces to violate the law. This permanent stationing encompasses the presence of the friendly foreign force and their families and is a closer analog for the reciprocal treatment given by Germany to the many hundreds of thousands of U.S. forces stationed in Germany under the NATO SOFA since 1955. 156 See Senate NATO SOFA Hearing, supra note 71, at 70 (The ratifying Senate considered this exact scenario in its considerations of the NATO SOFA Treaty and its potential domestic consequences for State criminal jurisdiction.) 157 The German military disciplinary system authorizes disciplinary courts-martial by its commanders, but these proceedings have no power to impose real criminal penalties. Their authority is similar to the U.S. non-judicial punishment authority under Article 15 of the U.C.M.J. For actual criminal proceedings the German military or family member is returned to Germany and is prosecuted by the State Prosecutor for the German State from which he comes. In a recent case involving a German service member accused of child abuse off base in Alamogordo, New Mexico, the In the second type of case, a foreign military member might commit spouse or child abuse in the family's off-post residence. Assuming both the victim and the accused in this hypothetical are German citizens present in the United States under the provisions of the SOFA, this is an "inter se" case, and again, under Article VII Germany would have primary jurisdiction.
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It is easy to comprehend the sensitivities of local prosecutors and courts in cases involving these and other types of criminal misconduct committed in their jurisdictions. 159 Nevertheless, a local court would be expected to analyze the provisions of the SOFA to determine the treatyimposed limitations on the exercise of its own jurisdiction, and in these cases, forego prosecution or dismiss 160 charges absent a German waiver of the right to exercise primary jurisdiction. If, however, the local court refused to defer to the German assertion of primary jurisdiction -the outcome mandated by Article VII of the NATO SOFA -the state through the decision of the local prosecutor or state judge, would effectively force the United States to breach its international obligations.
Interestingly, the Senate appears to have contemplated these type of conflicts when it considered the NATO SOFA during ratification hearings. In order to illustrate the potential interference with local elected District Attorney (DA) brought charges in New Mexico state court against the German service member. The local DA refused to dismiss the charges when the German government requested she do so in accordance with Article VII of the NATO SOFA as they had primary jurisdiction over this inter se case. Her refusal resulted in significant diplomatic discussions between the German government and the U.S. Department of State and Defense. Resort to the State of New Mexico Attorney General was unsuccessful as the local DA was an independent elected state official not subject to their oversight. Ultimately, the DA agreed to dismiss the charges and the German government returned their serviceman to Germany to face charges in German criminal court. The German government was also concerned that the case be returned to Germany so that appropriate child welfare agencies could become involved with the family. The local state judge had not been informed of the NATO 158 These two examples are equally present and sensitive when U.S. forces are present in Germany and commit offenses, and because of the numbers of U.S. forces present in Germany in the past 60 years, are more prevalent. 159 The interests of the U.S. state are easy to comprehend but similar cases have occurred in Germany since the NATO SOFA took effect over 60 years ago, and the German authorities, taking seriously their obligation to give sympathetic consideration to requests to waive primary jurisdiction, have frequently waived their primary right to prosecute American soldiers for equally serious injuries to German citizens. A refusal by a local state court to recognize a German right of primary jurisdiction under the SOFA could have serious ramifications to this on-going relationship to the detriment of overseas U.S. soldiers. These cases do occur, and they are usually handled by coordination between the local military base, the local prosecutor, and on occasion, the Department of Defense, the Foreign Government, and the local U.S. Attorney. 160 Or abate the case pending a German decision on ceding its primary jurisdiction.
state's rights, the Senate explicitly discussed the impact of the NATO SOFA jurisdictional sharing provisions on a hypothetical foreign soldier in the United States involved in an automobile accident while on official duty resulting in injury or fatality to a U.S. citizen. The Senate fully understood that if ratified, Article VII 161 would alter state criminal law under the Supremacy Clause, and further, it would regularly fall to the state courts to implement NATO SOFA obligations. Thus, the Senate envisioned a local court determining its own jurisdiction under the SOFA and the Supremacy Clause and dismissing any case in which the SOFA granted the primary right of prosecution to the foreign sending state. It is therefore clear the Senate understood the seriousness of this potential interference with U.S. state criminal jurisdiction. However, it also understood that permitting this interference was necessary to protect U.S. forces abroad from the plenary territorial sovereignty of allied receiving states, a trade-off certainly influenced by the expectation that U.S. forces would be affected by the SOFA far more frequently than allied forces in the United States. 162 In its hearings on the NATO SOFA the Senate expressed the understanding that state courts would comply with the Constitution's Supremacy Clause and properly limit their own jurisdiction to try the foreign military member in accordance with the SOFA's provisions. Furthermore, because the Senate considered the provisions of the NATO SOFA to be self-executing, Congress never passed explicit implementing laws that would allow the federal government to compel dismissal of the state criminal proceeding if it believed the state court did not properly interpret the SOFA provisions. 163 Indeed, in its hearings the Senate recognized that there was no real federal remedy if the local state criminal court improperly determined that it had jurisdiction over a visiting force member when the foreign sending state disagreed. Instead, such disparate interpretations of the SOFAs concurrent jurisdiction provision would be left to "the realm of international negotiation." 164 Such an unresolved breach could easily lead to retaliatory action by our NATO allies, affecting U.S. military members and their families overseas, but also the integrity of the defense alliance itself. This is especially true in our modern era, when unlike the height of the Cold War, foreign hosts of U.S. forces often perceive the U.S. military presence to be of less interest to their own security than to that of the U.S. Accordingly, enforcement of the NATO SOFA, and other analogous status agreements, is functionally dependent on a state court recognition and application of the SOFA's allocation of concurrent jurisdiction-recognition ostensibly mandated by the Supremacy Clause for treaties, and from the federal government perspective, hopefully for executive agreements as well. This enforcement is well within a state court's capabilities. However, should a court prove obdurate Vol. 5, No. 1 or a local prosecutor unconvinced of the importance of these SOFA provisions when weighed against local sovereignty and the interests of the local community, it would prove difficult to enforce compliance with these treaty provisions. Ironically, this was a problem the Founders certainly appreciated, as compliance with Treaty obligations was a driving reason for the failure of the Confederation. 165 Nonetheless, because they remove state criminal jurisdiction where the sending state has primary jurisdiction, SOFAs affect a traditional and core area of state sovereignty in the most fundamental way. Still, given that the Senate consented to the NATO SOFA Treaty as it was rejecting Senator Bricker's proposed constitutional amendment to overturn Missouri v. Holland, which explicitly permitted interference with traditional state prerogatives under the treaty power, any state failure to comply with the NATO SOFA's jurisdictional provisions would be particularly ironic. Bond, as resolved by the Supreme Court, only defers resolution of the extent of the 'invisible radiations' arising from the Tenth Amendment on treaty-implementing legislation, and does not address what limitations, if any, exist when, as directly contemplated by the Founders, the treaty is selfexecuting. 166 other soFas: executive & congressional-executive agreements While the NATO SOFA is the sole SOFA concluded as a treaty, the United States "is currently party to over 100 agreements that may be considered SOFAs." 167 These agreements can be bi-lateral, multi-lateral, reciprocal or non-reciprocal, and most SOFAs take the form of executive agreements. 168 The form of the SOFA agreement can arguably impact its domestic legal consequences. If the President is authorized by Congress to negotiate and conclude international agreements on particular subjects, or if the agreement is approved by a joint resolution of Congress, these "Congressional-Executive" agreements have been considered the equivalent of a treaty. 169 Although treaties clearly operate as the supreme law of the land under the Constitution's Supremacy Clause, the domestic effect of a SOFA concluded by congressional-executive agreement could arguably be subject to Bond's clear indication rule before it could affect the traditional division of law enforcement authority between federal and state governments. Although most SOFA agreements have been entered into as part of an overall mutual or bi-lateral defense or security agreements, only the NATO SOFA and the Partnership for Peace (PfP) SOFA are reciprocal, posing federalism concerns in their enforcement.
As part of post-Cold War diplomacy, the PfP Agreement authorized the establishment of bilateral agreements between NATO and individual Euro-Atlantic partner countries, usually former Warsaw pact countries, to encourage their democratization and integration with Europe and NATO. 170 The PfP applies most of the provisions of the NATO SOFA bilaterally between signatory states of the PfP and NATO member nations. 171 In 1994, Congress authorized the President to apply the provisions of the reciprocal NATO SOFA to PfP nations by entering into executive agreements to that effect. 172 As of 2012, an additional 24 counties are subject to the NATO SOFA through implementation of the PfP Agreement through executive agreement, with the NATO SOFA implemented by a treaty, and the PfP SOFA by a congressional-executive agreement. Between the NATO SOFA and the PfP SOFA, the U.S. has common reciprocal SOFA arrangements with approximately 58 countries, amounting to over half the SOFA arrangements currently in place.
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Just as the Supreme Court did not discuss the effects of its requirement for a clear indication that Congress sought to change the traditional balance of criminal authority, it also did not discuss whether and how such a clear indication would be shown when the source of the change was a congressional-executive agreement, such as the PfP SOFA agreements. The Senate in considering the NATO SOFA did understand, and accept, the effect of the SOFA's criminal jurisdiction provisions on traditional state criminal jurisdiction. While Congress clearly authorized the President to enter into these reciprocal PfP SOFA arrangements, and because the underlying PfP agreement requires direct application of the NATO SOFA provisions to these new countries, 174 they should have equal domestic effect. Nevertheless, just as the effect of the Bond decision on self-executing treaties is unknown, so too will be its effect on a reciprocal SOFA entered into as a congressionalexecutive agreement. Here, it is clear that reciprocity was authorized by Congress in the context of extending the NATO SOFA protections to PfP nations. Presumably, Congress in extending these provisions did so with the knowledge that the NATO SOFA itself was a self-executing treaty, and applied directly to affect state criminal jurisdiction. Such common sense evaluation of the statutory effect, however, may not be the sort of clear indication mandated by the Supreme Court in Bond.
conclusion
Limitations imposed on federal power pursuant to the U.S. federalist system of government are central to our democracy. However the exercise of the national treaty power, and the implementation of these agreements, have historically been immune from these limitations. This may no longer be the case as federalism concerns are now impacting the nation's implementation of core LOAC treaty obligations. The Bond case demonstrates that individual citizens will have standing to contest the validity of implementing legislation or perhaps self-executing treaties in circumscribing their behavior in areas traditionally reserved to the states.
Although not resolving Justice Holmes' 'invisible radiations' from the Tenth Amendment, Bond establishes that implementing legislation will not be interpreted to interfere with the traditional division of law enforcement authority between Federal and State governments absent a clear indication from Congress of that intent. Lurking in the background are SOFA treaties, treaties that reflect fundamental foreign policy, war powers, and national security decisions of the nation, but that similarly implicate the core of traditional states' areas of responsibility in our federal system. Given the central concern of the Founders during the drafting of the Constitution over the States' interference with the fulfillment of national treaty obligations, it is particularly ironic that federalism may still have an impact on such an important function of the federal government in the 21st Century.
Awareness of the periodic ebbs and flows of the relationship between the nation's treaty powers and federalism, against the backdrop of our nation's history, indicate that Congress and the President should directly address the federalism concerns extant in relation to adoption of treaties and other international agreements. The current position of the Supreme Court reflects these historic divides. Just as our Founders wrestled with the creation of unified nation capable of acting on the world stage as a legitimate member of the family of nations, the Court should carefully consider rulings, which in the name of federalism, emasculate the nation as a responsible international actor and compromise its vital national security interests. In spite of Justice Holmes resolution of questions related to the scope of the treaty power framed by the outcome of the Civil War, and President Eisenhower by the rejection of Senator Bricker's proposed constitutional amendments, Bond seems to have only exacerbated federalism uncertainty. The political branches must take up the mantle and provide much clearer statements of their expectation that treaties and international agreements, especially those related to status of visiting forces, trump states' rights.
